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Liminal	Spaces:	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	as	an	Incompletely	theorised	
agreement	
	
	
	
Stephanie	Switzer*	
	
Abstract		
	
Drawing	 on	 earlier	work	 by	 the	 author	 on	 the	 application	 of	 economic	 contract	 theory	 to	
preferential	treatment	in	favour	of	developing	countries
1
,	this	article	is	intended	to	provoke	
some	reflections	on	special	and	differential	treatment	within	the	World	Trade	Organisation	
(WTO).	The	concept	of	special	and	differential	treatment,	defined	as	measures	which	aim	to	
address	developing	and	least	developed	countries	(LDC)	relevant	development,	financial	and	
trade	needs,	has	the	potential	for	far-reaching	impacts	within	the	trading	regime,	depending	
upon	how	it	is	interpreted.	This	article	seeks	to	develop	a	theoretical	perspective	on	special	
and	 differential	 treatment.	 In	 developing	 this	 perspective,	 Cass	 Sunstein’s	 theory	 of	 the	
incompletely	theorised	agreement	is	utilised	to	understand	and	interrogate	the	core	features	
of	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment.	 Using	 this	 analytical	 lens,	 the	 article	 traces	 the	
construction	of	 special	 and	differential	 treatment	as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	agreement	
and	 elucidates	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 for	 the	 operation	 of	 special	 and	 differential	
treatment	 as	 an	 effective	 tool	 to	 address	 the	 development,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs	 of	
developing	 countries.	 The	 article	 will	 then	 evaluate	 recent	 changes	 to	 SDT	 which	 can	 be	
construed	as	an	effort	to	more	completely	theorise	SDT.	The	article	will	conclude	by	positing	
that	special	and	differential	currently	resides	within	a	liminal	or	transitional	space.	By	tracing	
the	 contours	 of	 such	 liminality,	 this	 article	will	 use	 the	 lens	 of	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	
agreement	to	channel	debate	on	the	development	of	this	area	of	trade	law	and	practice.		
INTRODUCTION	
	
There	are	over	170	provisions	of	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	 (SDT)	across	the	WTO	
covered	agreements	and	various	Ministerial,	General	Council	and	other	relevant	decisions.2	
																																								 																				
*	The	author	thanks	Prof.	Barry	Rodger,	Prof.	Elizabeth	Kirk,	Prof.	Elisa	Morgera	and	Dr	Gregory	Messenger	for	
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1
	See,	for	example,	Stephanie	Switzer,	‘A	Contract	Theory	Approach	to	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	and	
the	WTO’	Journal	of	International	Trade	Law	and	Policy,	2017,	15	(3):	126	–	140.		
2
	WTO,	Committee	on	Trade	and	Development	 (CTD),	 ‘Special	and	Differential	Treatment	Provisions	 in	WTO	
Agreements	 and	 Decisions	 –	 Note	 by	 the	 Secretariat’	 (22	 September	 2016)	 WT/COMTD/W/219,	 4.	 The	
Secretariat’s	note	does	not	include	the	SDT	provisions	of	the	Agreement	on	Trade	Facilitation	in	its	overview.	
For	a	fuller	analysis	of	the	WTO’s	SDT	measures,	see	Switzer,	supra	note	1.		
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Accordingly,	SDT	represents	an	‘integral’3	element	of	the	WTO	legal	compact.	It	is	generally	
associated	with	efforts	to	address	developing	countries’	and	LDCs’	relevant	developmental,	
financial	and	trade	needs4	and	includes	efforts	to,	among	other	things,	provide	preferential	
treatment	to	promote	developing	country	and	LDC	market	access,	the	provision	of	technical	
assistance	 and	 capacity	 building	 as	 well	 as	 the	 structuring	 of	 looser	 rules	 on	 market	
protection.5	 SDT	 is	 also	 a	 fundamental	 element	 of	 multilateral	 trade	 negotiations.6	 In	
launching	the	Doha	Round,	for	example,	Members	directed	that	SDT	should	be	an	integral	
element	of	negotiations	on	agricultural,	 ‘so	as	 to	be	operationally	effective	and	 to	enable	
developing	countries	to	effectively	take	account	of	their	development	needs,	including	food	
security	and	rural	development.’7	
	
Despite	the	prominence	of	SDT	within	WTO	legal	compact,	the	run	up	to	the	launch	of	the	
Doha	Round	of	multilateral	trade	negotiations	represented	a	high	water	mark	in	developing	
country	 and	 LDC	 dissatisfaction	 regarding	 SDT.8	 Such	 dissatisfaction	 culminated	 in	 the	
inclusion	 of	 a	 mandate	 to	 review	 the	 operation	 of	 SDT	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Doha	 Round	
negotiations.9	In	this	article,	we	utilize	Cass	Sunstein’s	concept	of	an	incompletely	theorised	
agreement	to	interrogate	the	cause	of	developing	country	dissatisfaction	with	SDT.10		
																																								 																				
3
	 WTO,	 Ministerial	 Conference	 Fourth	 Session,	 ‘Ministerial	 Declaration’	 (20	 November	 2001)	
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1;	para.	44.	
4
	See,	for	example,	GATT,	‘Differential	and	More	Favourable	Treatment	Reciprocity	and	Fuller	Participation	of	
Developing	Countries’	Decision	of	28	November	1979,	GATT	Doc	L/4903,	BISD	26S/203	(1980)	[hereinafter,	the	
Enabling	Clause];	Article	12.3	of	the	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	Agreement	(TBT);	Article	XXXVI:8	of	the	GATT.		
5
	Frank	Garcia,	‘Beyond	Special	and	Differential	Treatment’,	Boston	College	International	and	Comparative	Law	
Review,	 2004,	 27(2):	 291	 -	 317,	 at	 292.	 See	 also	 John	 Whalley,	 ‘Special	 and	 Differential	 Treatment	 in	 the	
Millennium	 Round’,	 CSGR	 Working	 Paper	 No	 30/99,	 (1999)	
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2095/1/WRAP_Whalley_wp3099.pdf	accessed	4	July	2017.			
6
	Indeed,	the	phrase	can	even	be	found	in	the	United	Nations	Sustainable	Development	Goals	in	Goal	14.6;	‘by	
2020,	 prohibit	 certain	 forms	 of	 fisheries	 subsidies	 which	 contribute	 to	 overcapacity	 and	 overfishing,	 and	
eliminate	subsidies	that	contribute	to	IUU	fishing,	and	refrain	from	introducing	new	such	subsidies,	recognizing	
that	appropriate	and	effective	special	and	differential	treatment	for	developing	and	least	developed	countries	
should	be	an	integral	part	of	the	WTO	fisheries	subsidies	negotiation.’	
7
	Doha	Declaration,	supra	note	3,	at	paragraph	13.	Indeed,	as	much	of	15%	of	the	text	of	the	Doha	Declaration	
is	devoted	 to	 the	grant	of	 special	 and	differential	 treatment,	 technical	 cooperation	and	 capacity	building	as	
well	 as	 the	 concerns	 of	 least	 developed	 countries;	 Arvind	 Panagariya,	 ‘Developing	 Countries	 at	 Doha:	 A	
Political	Economy	Analysis’,	The	World	Economy,	2002,	25(9):	1205	–	1233,	at	1224.	
8
	See,	for	example,	the	comments	of	the	Cuban	representative	in	WTO,	General	Council,	‘Minutes	of	Meeting	
Held	 on	 24	 March	 1999’,	 (12	 April	 1999)	 WT/GC/M/39,	 at	 paragraph	 8.	 See	 also	 the	 statement	 of	 the	
Representative	 of	 Morocco	 in	 WTO,	 CTD,	 ‘Note	 on	 the	 Meeting	 of	 19	 June	 1998’,	 (8	 July	 1998)	
WT/COMTD/M/21,	at	2.	
9
	See	generally	Doha	Round	Declaration,	supra	note	3,	at	paragraph	44.	See	also	WTO,	Ministerial	Conference	
Fourth	Session	‘Implementation	–	Related	Issues	and	Concerns:	Decision	of	14	November	2001’,	(20	November	
2001)	 WT/MIN(01)/17,	 at	 paragraph	 13	 (i)	 [hereinafter	 Implementation	 Decision].	 A	 compilation	 of	
outstanding	 implementation	 issues	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 Doha	 Round	 was	 set	 out	 in	WTO,	 ‘Compilation	 of	
Outstanding	Implementation	Issues	Raised	by	Members’,	(20	October	2001)	Job(01)/152/Rev.1.	
10
	Cass	R.	Sunstein,	‘Incompletely	Theorized	Agreements’,	Harvard	Law	Review,	1995,	108	(7):	1733	–	1772.	
Author	accepted	manuscript	–	forthcoming	(2018)	Manchester	Journal	of	International	Economic	
Law		
	
Incompletely	theorised	agreements	can	be	useful	to	ensure	stability	in	agreements	between	
diverse	groups.	We	don’t	need	to	agree	on	everything	to	agree	on	something.	Accordingly,	
such	 agreements	 may	 provide	 participants	 with	 a	 stable	 accommodation	 on	 a	 particular	
issue	since	 it	 is	sometimes	unnecessary	to	secure	agreement	on	all	aspects	of	a	particular	
action	or	provision.	An	incompletely	theorised	agreement	can	also	act	as	a	staging	post	to	
further	discussions	on	more	contentious	issues.	In	this	article,	I	review	numerous	provisions	
of	 SDT	 and	 find	 that	 many	 are	 incompletely	 theorised	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 they	 are	 to	 be	
operationalised	 to	 meet	 the	 relevant	 developmental,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs	 of	
developing	 countries	 and	 LDCs.	Operationalisation	of	 SDT	was	often	 left	 to	 the	discretion	
and/interpretation	of	developed	countries.	As	we	will	 show,	 such	 incomplete	 theorisation	
did	little	to	promote	stability	but	instead	led	to	accusations	of	bias	and	inconsistency	in	how	
developing	and	least-developed	country	needs	were	addressed.		
Sunstein	recognises	that	there	are	instances	when	fuller	theorisation	of	certain	agreements	
is	 required.	 	By	analysing	a	 range	of	SDT	provisions,	 I	offer	 some	suggestions	on	how	and	
when	 more	 complete	 theorisation	 of	 SDT	 may	 be	 useful.	 In	 so	 doing,	 I	 pay	 particular	
attention	 to	 a	 number	 of	 developments	 within	 the	 WTO	 and	 also	 scrutinise	 the	 WTO	
Agreement	on	Trade	Facilitation	(TFA).	This	agreement	entered	into	force	in	February	2017	
and,	 as	 outlined	 in	 a	 previous	 article	 by	 this	 author,	 contains	 a	 range	 of	 innovative	 SDT	
provisions.11	 Some	 commentators	 have	 opined	 that	 the	 TFA	 could	 offer	 something	 of	 a	
model	for	future	negotiations	on	SDT.12	In	this	article,	I	am	perhaps	more	circumspect	than	
others	of	the	capacity	of	the	TFA	to	provide	a	blueprint	for	the	future	development	of	SDT.	
However,	I	acknowledge	the	significance	of	the	TFA	for	how	its	SDT	provisions	have	allowed	
us	to	move	past	the	traditional	approach	to	such	treatment.	Indeed,	the	fresh	approach	to	
SDT	encompassed	under	the	TFA	is	demonstrative	of	how	particular	understandings	of	trade	
law	 are	 not	 self-evident	 but	 instead	 are	 constructed,	 and	 moreover	 may	 change,	 over	
time.13	 Accordingly,	 as	 I	will	 demonstrate,	what	 the	 TFA	 allows	 us	 to	 do	 is	 dismantle	 the	
existing	construction	of	SDT	so	that	we	may	‘reimagine’	the	trade	law	project	as	a	whole.14	
The	 article	 will	 conclude	 by	 positing	 that	 special	 and	 differential	 currently	 resides	 within	
what	we	may	call	a	 liminal	 space.	By	using	 the	 term	 liminal,	 I	 intend	to	evoke	 the	 idea	of	
transition	and	the	stepping	onto	the	threshold	of	something	new	but	at	the	same	time	still	
ambiguous.	 In	 the	 conclusion	 to	 this	 piece,	 I	 offer	 some	 thoughts	 on	where	 SDT	may	 be	
transitioning	to.		
	
																																								 																				
11
	Switzer,	supra	note	1.	
12
	 See	 generally	 Nicolas	 Lamp,	 ‘How	 Some	 Countries	 Became	 ‘Special’:	 Developing	 Countries	 and	 the	
Construction	of	Difference	in	Multilateral	Trade	Lawmaking’,	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law,	2015,	18	
(4):	743	-	771.	see	also	discussion	in	Switzer,	supra	note	1.	
13
	 See	 generally	 Andrew	 T.	 F.	 Lang,	 ‘Reflecting	 on	 ‘Linkage’:	 Cognitive	 and	 Institutional	 Change	 in	 the	
International	Trading	System’,	Modern	Law	Review,	2007,	70	(4):		523	–	549,	at	543.	
14
	Id.		
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This	article	builds	on	earlier	work	by	 the	author	which	 sought	 to	 frame	SDT	as	akin	 to	an	
incomplete	contract.15	By	utilising	 the	 tools	of	economic	contract	 theory	 to	analyse	SDT,	 I	
was	 able	 to	 argue	 for	 what	 in	 effect	 amounts	 to	 a	 life	 cycle	 analysis	 of	 SDT.	 While	
acknowledging	 the	 utility	 of	 economic	 contract	 theory	 for	 analysing	 SDT,	 this	 article	
attempts	to	address	a	particular	aspect	which	economic	contract	theory	cannot	address.	In	
essence,	 contractarian	 analysis	 is	 not	 particularly	 sensitive	 to	 normative	 concerns.	 This	
article	therefore	attempts	to	address	this	omission	in	my	earlier	analysis	of	SDT.		
	
The	 next	 section	 will	 provide	 an	 introduction	 to	 Sunstein’s	 concept	 of	 incompletely	
theorised	agreements.	This	will	be	followed	in	section	two	with	an	overview	of	the	current	
provisions	 on	 SDT	 within	 the	 WTO.	 I	 then	 marry	 together	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 previous	
sections	 to	 sketch	 the	 contours	 of	 SDT	 as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement.	 The	
ramifications	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 SDT	 as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement	 will	 be	
discussed	in	section	three	before	attention	is	turned	in	section	four	to	discussing	the	likely	
future	of	SDT.	 In	this	section,	 I	conceptualise	SDT	as	residing	within	a	 liminal	–	 in	essence,	
transitional	–	space.	In	section	five,	I	conclude	and	in	doing	so,	argue	that	there	is	a	pressing	
need	 to	 garner	 a	 range	 of	 conceptual	 tools	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 robust	 critique	 of	 future	 SDT	
proposals	to	channel	debate	on	the	development	of	this	area	of	trade	law	and	practice.	This	
article	 begins	 this	 quest	 for	 new	 conceptual	 tools	 by	 analysing	 Sunstein’s	 incompletely	
theorised	 agreement	 which,	 as	 we	 will	 see,	 provides	 a	 powerful	 critical	 framework	 for	
analysing	such	provisions	in	the	future.		
Before	 I	begin,	a	number	of	 caveats	must	be	acknowledged.	The	 first	of	 these	 is	 that	 this	
article	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 exhaustive	 account	 of	 the	 development	 of	 SDT	 within	 the	
multilateral	 trade	 regime.16	 Furthermore,	 this	 article	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	
analysis	of	all	170+	provisions	of	SDT	which	exist	in	the	WTO	legal	compact.	Instead,	I	adopt	
a	case	study	approach	to	this	review	of	SDT.	While	the	range	of	SDT	provisions	chosen	for	
the	case	studies	are	intended	to	represent	certain	of	the	main	types	of	SDT	‘on	offer’	within	
the	WTO,	as	with	any	case	study,	a	longer	word	count	would	have	allowed	for	a	broader	and	
																																								 																				
15
	Switzer,	supra	note	1.		
16
	 This	 has	 been	 done	 very	 well	 by	 other	 authors.	 See,	 for	 example,	 Raj	 Bhala,	 ‘Theological	 Categories	 for	
Special	and	Differential	Treatment’,	Kansas	Law	Review,	(2002)	50	(4):	635	–	693,	Uché	Eweluka,	‘Special	and	
Differential	Treatment	in	International	Trade	Law:	A	Concept	in	Search	of	Content’,	North	Dakota	Law	Review,	
(2003)	 79:	 831;	 Edwini	 Kessie,	 ‘Enforceability	 of	 the	 Legal	 Provisions	 Relating	 to	 Special	 and	 Differential	
Treatment	Under	the	WTO	Agreements’,	Journal	of	World	Intellectual	Property,	(2000)	3	(6):	955	-	975;	William	
Kerr,	 ‘Special	and	Differential	Treatment:	A	Mechanism	to	Promote	Development?’,	The	Estey	Centre	Journal	
of	 International	 Law	 and	 Trade	 Policy,	 (2005)	 6	 (2):	 84;	 W	 Kerr,	 ‘Special	 and	 Differential	 Treatment:	 A	
Mechanism	to	Promote	Development?’,	The	Estey	Centre	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Trade	Policy,	(2005)	
6	 (2):	 84;	 Edwini	 Kessie,	 "The	 Legal	 Status	 of	 Special	 and	Differential	 Treatment	 Provisions	Under	 the	WTO	
Agreements,"	in	WTO	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	George	Bermann	and	Petros	Mavroidis,	eds.	(Cambridge:	
Cambridge	 University	 Press),	 pp.	 15-21;	 Chang-Fa	 Lo,	 ‘From	 S&D	 Treatment	 to	 S&D	 Agreement	 Under	 the	
WTO:	Developing	Friendlier	Global	Governance	of	Trade	for	Developing	Countries’	Asian	Journal	of	WTO	and	
International	Health	Law	and	Policy,	(2006),	1:33.		
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more	 comprehensive	 analysis.	 In	 addition,	 while	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 incompletely	
theorised	agreement	is	adopted	as	a	conceptual	lens	for	our	analysis,	this	is	not	intended	as	
a	 call	 to	 arms	 against	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreements	 in	 general.	 Rather,	 this	work	 is	
intended	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 how	 at	 times;	 fuller	 theorisation	 of	 agreements	 and/or	
understandings	 may	 be	 required	 to	 guard	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 bias,	 self-interest	 and	
inconsistency.	 The	 frame	of	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	agreement	 is	 therefore	utilised	as	
both	an	evaluative	and	programmatic	 tool	 for	analysis	of	 future	provisions	of	SDT.	Finally,	
while	 in	 the	penultimate	and	concluding	sections	 I	 comment	on	 the	pertinent	question	of	
‘where	next’	for	special	and	differential	treatment,	I	am	also	cognizant	that	such	a	question	
cannot	be	answered	 solely	by	a	 legal	and	normative	analysis	but	owes	much	 to	 the	 (ever	
changing)	political	economy	of	the	trade	regime.		
	
SECTION	1	-	INCOMPLETELY	THEORISED	AGREEMENTS	
	
It	is	clear	that	‘well-functioning’	systems	of	law	have	a	tendency	to	adopt	certain	techniques	
to	ensure	stability.17	Implicit	in	the	work	of	Cass	Sunstein	is	the	idea	that	stability	is	provided	
through	agreement	between	disparate	parties	with	a	variety	of	interests.18	Sunstein	details	
how,	‘(a)rbiters	of	legal	controversies	try	to	produce	incompletely	theorized	agreements.’19		
As	contended	by	Sunstein,		
	 ‘[i]ncompletely	 theorised	agreements	play	a	pervasive	 role	 in	 law	and	 society.	 It	 is	
	 rare	for	a	person,	and	especially	a	group,	to	theorise	any	subject	completely	--	that	
	 is,	to	accept	both	a	highly	abstract	theory	and	a	series	of	steps	that	relate	the	theory	
	 to	 a	 concrete	 conclusion.	 In	 fact,	 people	 often	 reach	 incompletely	 theorised	
	 agreements	on	a	general	principle.	 Such	agreements	are	 incompletely	 theorised	 in	
	 the	sense	that	people	who	accept	the	principle	need	not	agree	on	what	it	entails	in	
	 particular	cases.’20		
It	 is	 clear	 that	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement	 may	 arise	 at	 various	 levels	 of	
abstraction.	First,	as	indicated	above,	such	agreements	may	arise	where	there	is	agreement	
upon	 a	 general	 principle	 but	 no	 consensus	 upon	 how	 the	 principle	 applies	 in	 particular	
situations.21	 People	 may	 hence	 believe	 that	 murder	 is	 wrong	 but	 may	 disagree	 on	 the	
subject	of	abortion.	Second,	agreement	may	be	secured	on	a	 so-called	mid-level	principle	
but	 not	 on	 the	 theory	which	 informs	 the	principle	 or	what	 it	 entails	 in	 individual	 cases.22	
																																								 																				
17
	Cass	R.	Sunstein,	Legal	Reasoning	and	Political	Conflict	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1996)	at	4.		
18
	Id.,	at	4.		
19
	Id.,	at	4.	
20
	Sunstein,	supra	note	10,	at	1739.	
21
	Id.,	see	generally.	
22
	Id.,	at	1739.	
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Finally,	 on	 other	 occasions,	 a	 ‘conceptual	 descent’	may	 be	 appropriate	where	 agreement	
cannot	be	formed	on	abstractions.23	As	such,	progress	can	be	made	by	moving	discussion	to	
a	more	concrete	level	of	particularity.24		
Sunstein,	while	employing	the	concept	of	the	incompletely	theorised	agreement	in	a	largely	
descriptive	 sense25,	 notes	 that	 in	 a	diverse	 (constitutional)	 setting,	 there	may	be	merit	 to	
avoiding	theoretical	or	practical	conflicts.26	Thus	the	incompletely	theorised	agreement	is	at	
times	a	useful	tool	in	that	it	makes	law	and	indeed	social	life	possible.27	Silence	on	an	issue	
which	may	prove	particularly	controversial,	for	example,	may	help	to	ease	potential	conflict	
and,	by	extension,	reduce	the	time	needed	to	come	to	agreement.28	 Indeed,	one	common	
conception	of	the	‘purpose’	of	law	is	to	either	provide	for	or	create	the	conditions	necessary	
for	 stability.29	 This	 concept	 of	 stability	 links	 well	 with	 the	 ‘ideal’	 of	 legal	 certainty	 which	
oftentimes	acts	as	a	‘regulative	idea’.30	However,	it	has	been	noted	that	this	perception	of	
law	 has	 a	 tendency	 to	 lead	 lawyers	 to	 forget	 about	 or	 indeed	 ignore	 the	 ‘political	
foundations’	 of	 legitimacy.31	 It	 is	 therefore	 essential	 that	 stability	 is	 not	 pursued	 to	 the	
detriment	of	a	legitimate	system	of	law	and	governance.	We	will	return	to	this	point	in	due	
course.		
Silence	 may	 also	 allow	 for	 learning	 and	 the	 development	 of	 consensus	 at	 some	 future	
date.32	To	 this	end,	 the	very	 fact	of	 law-making	 in	a	diverse	society	means	 that	 it	will	not	
always	 be	 desirable	 or	 indeed	 possible	 to	 fully	 theorise	 a	 particular	 area	 of	 law.	 This	 is	
because	 fuller	 theorisation	may	 prove	 to	 be	 overly	 contentious	 and	may	 be,	 in	 practical	
terms,	impossible.	Thus,	if	a	workable	agreement	can	be	reached,	it	should	not	matter	that	
the	 ‘grand	 theory’	 which	 accounts	 for	 the	 agreement	 is	 not	 fully	 theorised.	 Hence,	 for	
Sunstein,	 an	 agreement	 which	 is	 completely	 theorised	 may	 be	 unable	 to	 accommodate	
changes	 in	 values	 or	 facts	 over	 time.33	 Agreements	 that	 are	 incompletely	 theorised	may	
therefore	be	open	enough	to	incorporate	future	changes	in	values	and	facts.34	Indeed,	it	has	
																																								 																				
23
	 Cass	 R	 Sunstein,	 ‘Incompletely	 Theorised	 Agreements	 in	 Constitutional	 Law’,	 John	 M.	 Olin	 Law	 and	
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been	argued	that	at	the	heart	of	every	legal	system	is	a	tension	between	legal	security	and	
the	need	for	law	to	be	able	to	accommodate	unforeseen	cases.35	
Incompletely	 theorised	 agreements	 are	 relatively	 commonplace	 within	 the	 international	
legal	sphere	with,	for	example,	the	formation	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	
marked	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 agreement	 upon	 the	 ‘high-level’	 theory	 behind	 it.36	 However,	 it	
provided	 a	 framework	 upon	 which	more	 progressive	 understandings	 could	 be	 built.37	 By	
extension,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	importance	of	human	rights	and	associated	discourse	
is	 that	 it	provides	a	 framework	 for	 conversation	and	dialogue	about	 the	values,38	 thereby	
illustrating	where	there	is	agreement	before	going	on	to	try	and	obtain	further	agreement	
at	a	much	lower	level	of	abstraction.		
Sunstein	 provides	 a	 similar	 example	 in	 respect	 of	 racial	 equality.39	We	may	 agree	 on	 the	
mid-level	principle	of	outlawing	racial	discrimination	but	this	will	be	informed	by	competing	
depictions	of	what	is	meant	by	racial	equality.	Similarly,	at	a	lower	level,	we	may	disagree	on	
how	to	outlaw	racial	discrimination.	Should	we,	for	example,	impose	a	policy	of	affirmative	
action	to	achieve	our	goal	or	segregate	prisons	in	the	event	racial	tensions	are	particularly	
severe?40		Answering	such	questions	requires	us	to	elucidate	more	fully	on	our	reasons	for	
supporting	racial	equality.	This	 is	an	 inherently	difficult	task	with	many	preferring	to	avoid	
such	 questions	 and	 transfer	 their	 analysis	 to	 a	 level	where	 they	 are	more	 likely	 to	 reach	
agreement	with	other	relevant	parties.	Hence,	to	leave	a	particular	issue	unresolved	may	be	
meritorious	in	that	it	may	save	a	great	deal	of	time	negotiating	upon	an	issue	in	relation	to	
which	 agreement	 may	 never	 be	 possible.	 Accordingly,	 ‘[w]hat	 is	 said	 and	 resolved	 is	 no	
more	important	than	what	is	left	out.’41	
Summing	 up,	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement	 may	 be	 a	 useful	 device	 to	 promote	
stability	 where	 open	 ended	 conversations	 on	 particular	 issues	 are	 liable	 to	 produce	
tensions.	However,	it	must	also	be	discerned	whether	any	shortcomings	are	associated	with	
such	 agreements.	 In	 this	 regard,	 while	 there	may	 be	 benefit	 to	 forming	 an	 incompletely	
theorised	agreement,	at	times	they	can	hide	the	existence	of	inequality	or	injustice.	
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Accordingly,	 Sunstein	 has	 recognised	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	
agreement	 will	 at	 times	 be	 limited.42	 As	 such,	 ‘fuller	 theorisation’	 of	 an	 issue	may	 be	 of	
benefit	to	promote	a	‘wider	and	deeper	inquiry	into	the	grounds	for	judgment’	and	prevent	
‘inconsistency,	bias,	or	self	interest.’43	Furthermore,	while	one	of	the	central	advantages	of	
incompletely	theorised	agreements	is	the	role	they	play	in	promoting	stability;	such	stability	
should	not	be	at	the	cost	of	justice.44	Where	an	agreement	provides	stability	at	the	expense	
of,	 for	 example,	 just	 outcomes	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 particular	 sector	 of	 society,	 the	 stability	
provided	will	be	short-term	in	duration.	It	is	hence	clear	that	stability	is	not	an	‘overriding’	
social	 good	 to	 be	 striven	 for	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 all	 other	 goals	 or	 values.45	 Thus	 Sunstein	
recognises	 that	 certain	 background	 ideas	 are	 required	 to	 act	 as	 gate	 keepers	 against	 the	
threat	of	unjust	incompletely	theorised	agreements.46		
As	I	illustrate	in	the	next	section,	fuller	theorisation	of	the	provisions	of	SDT	is	revelatory	of	
the	fact	that	they	are	tainted	by	self-interest,	bias	and	inconsistency.	Furthermore,	it	will	be	
argued	 that	 the	 actual	 construction	 of	 the	 legal	 provisions	 of	 SDT	 was	 such	 as	 to	 deny	
developing	countries	the	ability	to	articulate	their	development,	financial	and	trade	needs.	
Given	that	these	provisions	are	founded	upon	the	notion	that	they	should	meet	such	needs,	
this	 is	normatively	 troubling	and,	as	we	will	 see,	 led	to	developing	country	demands	 for	a	
review	of	such	provisions	so	as	to	make	them	more	precise,	effective	and	operational.47		
	
SECTION	2	-	SDT	AS	AN	INCOMPLETELY	THEORISED	AGREEMENT	
	
In	 this	 section,	 we	 utilise	 the	 analytical	 frame	 provided	 by	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	
agreement	 to	 interrogate	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 provisions	 of	 special	 and	 differential	
treatment	are	constructed.		
From	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 GATT	 in	 1947,	 just	 under	 half	 of	 the	 organisation’s	 membership	
could	 be	 termed	 developing.48	 The	 relationship	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	
countries	 in	 the	 GATT	 was	 one	 of	 formal	 equality	 based	 upon	 the	most-favoured-nation	
[MFN]	clause	in	GATT	Article	I:1.49	As	a	consequence,	there	was	no	special	regime	in	place	to	
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cater	 to	 the	 development,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs	 of	 developing	 countries.	 Since	 there	
were	 undoubtedly	 economic	 differences	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries,	 it	
was	contended	in	the	early	years	of	the	GATT	that	ignoring	such	differences	and	treating	the	
two	groups	equally	resulted	in	a	form	of	inequality.	As	the	representatives	of	India	claimed	
at	the	19th	session	of	the	Contracting	Parties	to	the	GATT	in	1964,	‘equality	of	treatment	is	
equitable	 only	 among	 equals.’50	 Similar	 sentiments	were	 expressed	 in	 a	 statement	 to	 the	
United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	 [UNCTAD]	 in	 the	same	year	 to	the	
effect	 that	 ‘no	matter	 how	 valid	 the	 principle	 of	 [most-favoured-nation]	may	 be	 in	 trade	
relations	 between	 equals,	 it	 is	 not	 an	 acceptable	 and	 adequate	 concept	 for	 trade	 among	
countries	with	highly	unequal	economic	power.’51		
Throughout	the	early	years	of	the	GATT,	developing	countries	therefore	sought	differential	
treatment	 based	 upon	 what	 they	 conceived	 of	 as	 their	 fundamental	 difference	 from	
developed	countries.52	Legal	change	would,	however,	soon	come	about	with	amendments	
to	GATT	Article	XVIII	 during	 the	1954-1955	GATT	 review	 session	 to	provide,	 inter	alia,	 for	
developing	 countries	 to	 utilise	 quantitative	 restrictions	 for	 balance-of-payments	
difficulties.53	This	was	followed	in	1964	with	a	further	amendment	to	the	GATT	to	include	a	
new	Part	 IV	on	Trade	and	Development.54	 The	new	Part	 IV	 introduced	 three	new	Articles	
into	the	GATT,	the	first	of	which,	Article	XXXVI	on	Principles	and	Objectives,	recognised	the	
need	for	rapid	and	sustained	expansion	of	the	export	earnings	of	developing	countries.	This	
was	 to	 be	 achieved	 through	 more	 favourable	 market	 access	 conditions	 for	 products	 of	
interest	 to	 developing	 countries	 and	 the	 diversification	 of	 the	 economies	 of	 developing	
countries	 to	 avoid	 excessive	 dependence	 upon	 primary	 products.	 Of	 greater	 significance	
was	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 ‘non-reciprocity’	 whereby;	 ‘[t]he	 developed	
contracting	 parties	 do	 not	 expect	 reciprocity	 for	 commitments	 made	 by	 them	 in	 trade	
negotiations	to	reduce	or	remove	tariffs	and	other	barriers	 to	the	trade	of	 less-developed	
contracting	parties.’55	
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Following	this,	in	June	1971,	a	waiver	was	granted	by	the	GATT	Contracting	Parties	to	allow	
non-reciprocal	preferential	 tariff	 treatment	 to	be	granted	 in	 favour	of	developing	 country	
imports.56	 Initially	authorised	for	ten	years,	such	preferential	tariff	schemes,	known	by	the	
moniker	the	generalised	system	of	preferences	(GSP),	were	given	a	permanent	legal	basis	by	
way	 the	 1979	 Decision	 on	 ‘Differential	 and	 More	 Favourable	 Treatment	 Reciprocity	 and	
Fuller	 Participation	 of	 Developing	 Countries.’	 This	 set	 out	 that,	 ‘notwithstanding	 the	
provisions	of	Article	I	of	the	General	Agreement,	contracting	parties	may	accord	differential	
and	more	 favourable	 treatment	 to	developing	countries	without	affording	such	 treatment	
to	other	contracting	parties.’57	Intended	to	provide	durable	legal	authorisation	for	the	GSP,	
this	 decision,	 commonly	 termed	 the	 ‘Enabling	 Clause’,	 detailed	 that	 such	 differential	 and	
more	 favourable	 treatment	would	apply	 to	preferential	 treatment	accorded	by	developed	
contracting	parties	to	products	from	developing	countries	under	the	GSP.		
The	Enabling	Clause	contains	no	time	limits	and	is	in	force	today,	having	been	incorporated	
into	 the	 GATT	 1994.58	 In	 addition	 to	 granting	 permanent	 permission	 for	 the	 GSP,	 the	
Enabling	 Clause	 also	 authorised	 tariff	 preferences	 between	 developing	 countries,	 more	
favourable	 treatment	 for	 developing	 countries	 with	 regard	 to	 non-tariff	 barriers	 to	 trade	
and	more	favourable	treatment	for	the	least	developed	of	the	developing	country	group.	A	
‘graduation	 clause’	 was	 introduced	 into	 the	 Enabling	 Clause	 such	 that	 while	 developed	
countries	 would	 not	 expect	 reciprocity	 from	 developing	 countries	 which	 would	 be	
inconsistent	 with	 their	 development,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs,	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 the	
capacity	 of	 developing	 countries	 to	 make	 contributions	 would	 improve	 with	 their	
progressive	 development.59	 SDT	 would	 not,	 therefore,	 consist	 of	 an	 open-ended	 non-
reciprocal	relationship.	As	articulated	by	the	former	GATT	Director	General,	Oliver	Long,		
The	contention	that	equality	of	treatment	creates	a	condition	of	inequality	between	
developed	and	developing	 countries	was	 the	main	 justification	 and	motive	 for	 the	
introduction	of	preferential	treatment.	A	logical	consequence	of	this	precept	is	that,	
as	the	economic	situation	of	developing	countries	improves,	equality	should	become	
progressively	the	rule.60	
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While	 the	 above	 elucidation	 of	 the	 development	 of	 differential	 treatment	 in	 favour	 of	
developing	countries	 in	the	GATT	would	seem	to	 indicate	that	developed	Members	of	the	
GATT	 were	 supportive	 of	 the	 grant	 of	 such	 treatment,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 case.61	 Rather,	
developed	 countries	 agreed	 to	 developing	 country	 demands	 for	 differential	 treatment	
provisions	for	pragmatic	reasons	related	to	a	desire	for	the	‘bicycle	club’	of	the	GATT	to	stay	
upright.62	Accordingly,	one	commentator	has	pointed	out	that	with	regard	to	industrialised	
countries;		
[W]hile	 self-interest	 surely	 explains	 many	 of	 the	 inconsistencies	 and	 exceptions	
	 that	 riddle	 multilateral	 trade	 agreements	 that	 resulted	 largely	 from	
	 (industrialised		countries’)	 leadership	 of	 the	 international	 trade	 regime,	 other	
	 explanations	 seem	 also	 to	 carry	 at	 least	 partial	 weight…	 They	 may	 have	
	 pragmatically	 conceded	 to	 political	 pressures	 in	 particular	 contexts	 in	 order	 to	
	 keep	the	larger	progressionist	model	on	course.63		
It	 has	 been	 similarly	 contended	 that	 the,	 ‘goal	 of	 (the)	GSP	was	 to	 obtain	 support	 of	 the	
developing	countries	 for	 the	GATT	system.’64	During	 the	1960s	and	1970s,	 the	developing	
country	group	dominated	UNCTAD	was	deemed	as	a	 threat	 to	 the	existence	of	 the	GATT,	
prompting	a	resigned	acceptance	on	the	behalf	of	the	developed	countries	that	‘something	
would	 have	 to	 be	 done’	 about	 the	 preference	 issue.65	 Such	 ‘formal	 prescriptive	
differentiation’	to	ensure	developing	country	support	was	not	only	a	fundamental	element	
of	 the	 trade	 regime	but	 also	 existed	 in	other	 areas	of	 international	 law	 such	 as	 the	1990	
London	Amendments	to	the	1987	Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	deplete	the	Ozone	
Layer.66	
Within	 the	 trade	 regime,	 there	 may	 have	 been	 acceptance	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 differential	
treatment	 as	 a	 ‘response’	 to	 developing	 country	 needs	 but	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 such	
acceptance	 implied	 a	 normative	 commitment	 is	 questionable.	 Ochieng	 argues	 that	 the	
‘lackluster’	[sic]	history	of	SDT	in	the	GATT/WTO	can	be	traced,	at	least	in	part,	to	‘different	
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epistemic	and/or	ideological	visions	of	development’67	between	developed	and	developing	
countries.	Accordingly,	in	order	to	‘create	a	rule-based	multilateral	trading	system	in	which	
both	parties	could	participate,	compromises	were	made,	most	notably	on	the	dual	principles	
of	reciprocity	and	non-reciprocity.’68	 Indeed,	 in	agreeing	to	the	construction	of	differential	
treatment	 as	 ‘exceptions’,	 developed	 countries	 were	 able	 to	 construct	 the	 trade	 regime	
they	 wanted	 since	 developing	 country	 demands	 were	 conceptualised	 as	 ‘different’	 and	
outside	 the	 normal	 trade	 regime	 system.69	 The	 provisions	 of	 differential	 treatment	 for	
developing	countries	agreed	to	under	the	GATT	thus	constituted	in	the	main	‘an	agreement	
to	 disagree’	 but	 failed	 to	 act	 as	 a	 staging	 post	 to	more	 engaged	 discussions.	 This	 set	 the	
scene	 for	 attempts	 under	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 of	 multilateral	 trade	 negotiations	 to	
commence	with	 the	eradication	of	 such	difference	with	developing	 countries	expected	 to	
subscribe	to	a	trade	regime	largely	shaped	by	developed	country	interests.70		
The	Uruguay	Round	negotiations	which	led	to	the	formation	of	the	WTO	would	continue	to	
subscribe	to	the	principle	of	differential	treatment	in	favour	of	developing	countries	but	the	
tools	used	to	effect	such	treatment	would	undergo	a	change.	Under	the	GATT,	measures	of	
differential	 and	 more	 favourable	 treatment	 focused	 upon	 granting	 developing	 countries	
special	rights	to	protect	their	markets	and	offered	them	enhanced	access	to	the	markets	of	
developed	 countries,71	 summarised	 elsewhere	 as	 the	 right–of-access	 and	 the	 right–to-	
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multilateralism	appears	negative	only	when	set	against	the	steady	push	towards	small	government,	more	open	
markets	 and	 freer	 trade	 championed	 under	 the	 neoliberal	 approach	 to	 development.”	 See	 also	 in	 general	
terms,	 Daniel	 K.	 Tarullo,	 ‘Beyond	 Normalcy	 in	 the	 Regulation	 of	 International	 Trade’,	Harvard	 Law	 Review,	
1987,	100	(3):	546	–	628,	and	McGee	and	Steffek,	supra	note	65.	
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protect.72	 However,	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 WTO	 ushered	 in	 a	 new	 era	 of	 special	 and	
differential	which	largely	replaced	such	concerns	with	an	emphasis	on	the	special	problems	
developing	 countries	 may	 incur	 in	 implementing	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 agreements.73	 This	
emphasis	upon	‘implementation’	and	by	extension	compliance,	together	with	the	formation	
of	 the	 WTO	 as	 a	 single	 undertaking,	 is	 representative	 of	 a	 linear	 movement	 towards	
progress	with	progress	being	measured	as	 the	 ability	 of	 countries	 to	undertake	 the	 same	
legal	 commitments.	 Deborah	 Cass,	 however,	 noted	 that	 a	 linear	 presentation	 of	 history	
tends	 to	 bury	 inequalities	 which	 may	 lie	 at	 the	 foundational	 heart	 of	 some	 doctrinal	
developments.74	 Indeed,	 critical	 legal	 scholarship	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 international	 law	 has	
tended	 to	emphasise	how	 international	 law	 ‘constantly	 reiterates	 its	own	history	 so	as	 to	
present	the	field	as	a	narrative	of	inevitable	progress	and	modernisation.’75		
Drawing	on	the	above,	a	central	 tool	employed	 in	the	WTO	provisions	on	SDT	to	facilitate	
implementation	of	 the	Uruguay	Round	agreements	was	 the	 grant	of	 transition	periods	 to	
developing	 countries.76	 These	would	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 giving	 developing	 countries	 extra	
time	 to	 implement	 their	 commitments	 under	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 agreements.	 These	
transition	periods	were	set	in	an	arbitrary	way	and	were	not	linked	to	the	particular	needs	
of	 developing	 countries	 or	 based	 on	 any	 substantive	 calculation	 of	 the	 difficulties	
developing	 countries	would	 face	 in	 implementation.77	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 construction	 of	
SDT	in	the	form	of	transition	periods	granted	to	developing	countries	such	as	to	assist	in	the	
implementation	 of	 their	 trade	 commitments	 reveals	 an	 intrinsic	 belief	 that	 each	 of	 the	
WTO’s	agreements	was	suitable	for	each	Member	country.	Under	this	account,	it	is	not	the	
agreement	 itself	 that	 is	 the	 problem;	 it	 is	 the	 capacity	 constraints	 of	 the	 individual	
developing	country	that	are	problematic.78		
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2007,	10	(3):	553	-	570,	at	554.	
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the	 World	 Trade	 Organization’,	 Global	 Development	 Studies,	 no.2,	 2005,	
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Indeed,	a	particular	characteristic	of	the	SDT	provisions	agreed	to	during	the	Uruguay	Round	
was	that	they	were	transacted	on	an	agreement	specific79	and	ad	hoc	basis80	with	little	by	
way	of	an	underlying	normative	framework.	The	rationale	provided	by	the	WTO	Secretariat	
for	the	construction	of	special	and	differential	treatment	in	this	way	was	that	‘[r]ather	than	
operating	 as	 a	 general	 principle,	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 are	 tailored	 to	 the	 needs	 in	
accordance	with	each	Agreement.’81		What	is	interesting	about	this	statement	is	that	it	does	
not	focus	upon	the	individual	needs	which	a	country	may	have	in	terms	of	benefiting	from	
membership	 of	 the	 WTO	 as	 a	 whole.	 Rather,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘needs’	 mentioned	 in	 the	
Secretariat	note	is	to	be	understood	as	relating	to	a	country’s	ability	to	implement	individual	
agreements.		
Summing	up	what	we	have	discussed	so	far,	it	is	argued	that	the	provisions	of	SDT	under	the	
GATT	and	latterly	the	WTO	were	incompletely	theorised.	In	relation	to	certain	measures	of	
special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 such	 as	 the	 GSP,	 there	 was	 agreement	 for	 differential	
treatment	to	be	 included	but	the	reasons	for	such	treatment	were	 incompletely	theorised	
with	developed	countries	agreeing	to	such	special	treatment	largely	on	pragmatic	grounds.	
As	 we	 will	 see,	 how	 such	 treatment	 would	 operate	 in	 practice	 would	 also	 remain	
incompletely	 theorised.	 Other	 measures	 of	 SDT	 were	 incompletely	 theorised	 with	
agreement	secured	at	a	lower	level.	In	respect	of	transition	periods,	for	example,	there	was	
agreement	at	a	very	low	level	of	abstraction	on	the	period	of	time	applicable	to	transition	
periods.	 What	 was	 incompletely	 theorised	 was	 the	 higher	 order	 principles	 of	 why	 such	
treatment	should	be	granted	in	the	first	place	with,	as	acknowledged	by	the	Secretariat,	SDT	
failing	to	operate	as	a	general	principle.	This	lack	of	incomplete	theorisation	led	to	a	failure	
to	enquire	as	to	the	suitability	of	such	measures	to	address	developing	country	needs.	In	the	
abstract,	and	as	articulated	above,	incompletely	theorised	agreements	can	provide	stability	
but	 as	 we	will	 see,	 SDT	 instead	 came	 to	 be	 associated	with	 bias,	 inconsistency	 and	 self-
interest.	We	explore	this	in	the	next	section.		
	
SECTION	THREE	-	THE	PROBLEM(S)	WITH	INCOMPLETE	THEORISATION	
In	this	section,	we	utilise	a	number	of	case	studies	to	explore	the	problems	associated	with	
incomplete	 theorisation	 of	 SDT.	 A	 case	 study	 approach	 is	 adopted	 due	 to	 the	 very	 large	
number	of	SDT	provisions	which	exist	under	 the	 legal	 framework	of	 the	multilateral	 trade	
regime	 and	 the	 limited	 word	 count	 available.	 While	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 case	 study	 is	 by	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
negotiated),	 and	 therefore	 only	 some	 of	 the	 costs	 are	 ‘excessive’.	 The	 excess	 could	 be	 because	 developing	
countries	are	required	to	catch	up	unduly	quickly	or	to	incur	costs	relatively	early	in	their	history.’	
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necessity	 limited,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 intended	 to	 discuss	 the	 main	 types	 of	 SDT	 available	
under	the	WTO.	
We	have	already	introduced	the	GSP	and	it	is	posited	that	this	serves	as	a	paradigm	example	
of	the	 incomplete	theorisation	of	SDT.	To	expand,	the	 legal	construction	of	the	GSP	under	
both	the	1971	waiver	decision	and	the	Enabling	Clause	represents	an	agreement	upon	the	
mid-level	principle	of	preferential	tariff	treatment	in	favour	of	developing	countries	without	
consequent	 agreement	 on	 what	 such	 treatment	 entails	 in	 particular	 cases.	 There	 is,	 for	
example,	no	direction	given	in	either	the	1971	waiver	decision	or	the	Enabling	Clause	as	to	
whether	it	is	permissible	to	exclude	countries	ab	initio	from	the	grant	of	tariff	preferences.	
Furthermore,	while	 the	Enabling	Clause	 lists	 the	mid-level	principle	 that	preferential	 tariff	
treatment	 should	 serve	 as	 a	 response	 to	 developing	 country	 development,	 financial	 and	
trade	needs,82	 no	direction	 is	 given	as	 to	 the	 sort	of	preferential	 tariff	 treatment	 likely	 to	
achieve	 these	 aims	or	 indeed,	 the	definition	 that	 should	be	 accorded	 to	 such	needs.	 This	
compromise,	reflected	as	an	incompletely	theorised	agreement,	had	the	capacity	to	hide	or	
disguise	the	existence	of	certain	abstractions	such	as	the	fact	that	under	the	GSP,	developed	
country	 ‘donor’	 states	 were	 able	 to	 articulate	 a	 unilateral	 construction	 of	 developing	
country	needs.83	
Linking	the	above	point	with	the	commentary	so	far	on	the	GSP,	it	is	notable	that	discussion	
on	 tariff	 preferences	 has	 referred	 to	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 grant	 of	 preferences	 as	
constituting	a	conditional	gift.84	 In	contrast	 to	 the	obligation	contained	 in	Article	 I.1	GATT	
that	requires	MFN	treatment	to	be	extended	unconditionally	to	all	other	Member	countries,	
there	is	no	provision	in	the	Enabling	Clause	to	the	effect	that	the	grant	of	preferences	must	
be	‘unconditional.’	Certain	donor	countries	have	thus	felt	 free	to	attach	certain	conditions	
to	 the	 receipt	 of	 tariff	 preferences	 under	 the	 GSP.85	 By	 conditioning	 the	 receipt	 of	
preferences	upon	the	fulfilment	of	certain	conditions,	donor	countries	were	able	to	extract	
certain	benefits	from	the	recipient	states.	In	other	words,	the	offer	of	tariff	preferences	was	
in	certain	instances	tantamount	to	a	‘conditional	gift’86.		
The	legal	framework	of	the	GSP	was	examined	in	the	WTO	dispute	of	EC-Tariff	Preferences.87	
A	central	 issue	 in	 the	dispute	was	whether	 it	was	permissible	 for	a	state	with	a	GSP	tariff	
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preference	 scheme	 to	 differentiate	 between	 developing	 country	 recipients	 of	 such	
preferential	tariff	treatment.	In	seeking	to	answer	this	question,	the	Appellate	Body	looked	
to	the	history	and	objectives	of	the	Enabling	Clause.	In	doing	so,	it	noted	that	Members	are	
encouraged	 to	 deviate	 from	 their	 MFN	 commitments	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 special	 and	
differential	 treatment	 in	 favour	 of	 developing	 countries.88	 In	 so	 doing,	 Members	 may	
differentiate	between	GSP	beneficiaries	 in	a	way	 that	 responds	positively	 to	 the	 ‘needs	of	
developing	countries.’89	However,	in	allowing	for	such	differentiation,	‘even	if	constructed	in	
accordance	with	the	notion	that	it	should	act	as	a	positive	response	to	a	relevant	need,	the	
Appellate	 Body	 in	 effect	 sanctioned	 the	 ability	 of	 developed	 countries	 to	 put	 forward	 a	
unilateral	construction	of	‘need’	–	albeit	within	defined	limits	–	in	the	grant	of	preferential	
tariff	 treatment.’90	 Accordingly,	 the	 original	 aims	 of	 the	 GSP	 to	 promote	 growth	 and	
development	have	not	been	delivered	upon.91	
Another	provision	of	SDT	which	illustrates	the	points	made	above	in	relation	to	the	GSP	is	
Article	 15	 of	 the	WTO	 Antidumping	 Agreement	 (ADA)	 which	 directs	 that,	 ‘special	 regard	
must	be	given	by	developed	country	Members	to	the	special	situation	of	developing	country	
Members	 when	 considering	 the	 application	 of	 anti-dumping	 measures	 under	 this	
Agreement.’	 Again,	 we	 may	 posit	 that	 this	 direction	 is	 incompletely	 theorised;	 there	 is	
agreement	 on	 the	 mid-level	 principle	 that	 special	 regard	 should	 be	 had	 to	 developing	
country	Members	but	not	on	the	low	level	principle	of	what	such	regard	actually	requires	or	
indeed,	on	the	more	abstract	 reasons	 for	 the	grant	of	such	treatment.	Article	15	ADA	has	
been	reviewed	by	a	WTO	dispute	settlement	panel	in	US	—	Steel	Plate	which	held	that	the	
provision	 did	 not	 impose	 a	 ‘specific	 or	 general	 obligation	 on	Members	 to	 undertake	 any	
particular	 action.’92	 As	 such,	 ‘Members	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	 comply	with	 an	 obligation	
whose	parameters	are	entirely	undefined.’93	Under	the	first	sentence	of	this	Article,	to	the	
extent	that	‘special	regard’	should	be	given	to	developing	countries,	such	regard	need	only	
be	 had	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘final	 decision	 whether	 to	 apply	 a	 final	 measure,	 and	 not	
intermediate	decisions	concerning	such	matters	as	investigative	procedures	and	choices	of	
methodology	during	the	course	of	the	investigation.’94		
The	second	sentence	of	Article	15	ADA	states	that,	 ‘[p]ossibilities	of	constructive	remedies	
provided	 for	 by	 this	 Agreement	 shall	 be	 explored	 before	 applying	 anti-dumping	 duties	
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where	 they	 would	 affect	 the	 essential	 interests	 of	 developing	 country	 Members.’	 With	
regards	to	the	operation	of	this	second	sentence,	the	Panel	in	EC-Bed	Linen	has	held	that;	
In	 our	 view,	while	 the	 exact	 parameters	 of	 the	 term	 are	 difficult	 to	 establish,	 the	
concept	of	 ‘explore’	 clearly	does	not	 imply	 any	particular	outcome.	We	 recall	 that	
Article	15	does	not	require	that	‘constructive	remedies’	must	be	explored,	but	rather	
that	 the	 ‘possibilities’	 of	 such	 remedies	must	 be	 explored,	 which	 further	 suggests	
that	the	exploration	may	conclude	that	no	possibilities	exist,	or	that	no	constructive	
remedies	are	possible,	in	the	particular	circumstances	of	a		given	 case.	 Taken	 in	 its	
context,	 however,	 and	 in	 light	 of	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 Article	 15,	 we	 do	
consider	 that	 the	 ‘exploration’	 of	 possibilities	must	 be	 actively	 undertaken	 by	 the	
developed	country	authorities	with	a	willingness	to	reach	a	positive	outcome.	Thus,	
in	 our	 view,	 Article	 15	 imposes	 no	 obligation	 to	 actually	 provide	 or	 accept	 any	
constructive	remedy	that	may	be	identified		and/or	 offered.	 It	 does,	 however,	
impose	an	obligation	to	actively	consider,	with	an	open	mind,	the	possibility	of	such	
a	 remedy	 prior	 to	 imposition	 of	 an	 anti-dumping	 measure	 that	 would	 affect	 the	
essential	interests	of	a	developing	country.95	
The	 obligation	 set	 out	 in	 the	 second	 sentence	 of	 Article	 15	 is	 that	 Members	 should	
‘consider’	 the	 possibility	 of	 constructive	 remedies	 where	 the	 imposition	 of	 anti-dumping	
remedies	would	affect	the	essential	interests	of	a	developing	country	Member.	Beyond	such	
consideration,	 there	 is	no	obligation	to,	 for	example,	grant	a	particular	remedy	or	reach	a	
particular	outcome.	As	such,	it	is	incompletely	theorised	in	terms	of	the	outcome	it	calls	for	
but	also	in	terms	of	the	principles	which	inform	the	obligation.	The	fact	Article	15	ADA	does	
not	impose	upon	Members	any	hard	obligations	beyond	‘consideration’	of	the	possibility	of	
‘constructive	 remedies’	 should	 not	 have	 come	 as	 any	 great	 surprise.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
provision	 in	 question	 is	 identical	 to	 Article	 13	 of	 the	 GATT	 Tokyo	 Round	 Code	 on	
Antidumping,	in	relation	to	which	developing	countries	had	expressed	concerns	prior	to	the	
formal	 commencement	 of	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 of	multilateral	 trade	 negotiations	 that	 the	
normative	obligation	therein	was	not	being	adhered	to.96	
The	relative	ineffectiveness	of	Article	13	of	the	Tokyo	Code	was	underlined	by	a	subsequent	
GATT	 Panel	 in	 Brazil	 –	 Cotton	 yarns97	 which	 considered	 any	 obligation	 therein	 to	 be	
something	of	a	‘dead	letter.’98	While	the	Panel	in	EC-Bed	Linen	undoubtedly	departed	from	
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the	view	of	the	GATT	Panel	in	Brazil	–	Cotton	yarns	in	terms	of	operationalising	the	duty	to	
consider	the	possibility	of	constructive	remedies,	it	could	not	read	into	the	text	of	the	Article	
an	obligation	that	is	simply	not	there;	that	is,	an	obligation	to	accept	or	impose	a	particular	
remedy.	 Again,	 in	 relation	 to	 such	 provisions,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 it	 is	 for	 the	 Member	
imposing	anti-dumping	duties	to	decide	what	is	meant	by	the	term	‘constructive	remedies’	
in	respect	of	providing	a	response	to	developing	country	needs.	Under	such	a	narrative,	the	
identification	of	developing	 country	needs	becomes	a	 construct	of	 the	developed	country	
donor	and	not	the	recipient	of	such	‘special’	treatment.		
Article	15	ADA	was	flagged	for	review	under	the	Doha	Round.99	The	specific	review	mandate	
directed	 that	 ‘while	Article	15	of	 the	Agreement	on	 the	 Interpretation	of	Article	VI	of	 the	
General	 Agreement	 on	 Tariffs	 and	 Trade	 is	 a	mandatory	 provision,	 the	modalities	 for	 its	
application	would	benefit	from	clarification.100	Accordingly,	the	Committee	on	Anti-Dumping	
Practices	(ADP)	was	instructed,	through	its	working	group	on	Implementation,	to	‘examine	
this	 issue	and	to	draw	up	appropriate	recommendations	within	 twelve	months	on	how	to	
operationalize	 this	 provision.’101	 Pursuant	 to	 this,	 the	 ‘Friends	 of	 Anti-dumping’	 group	
proposed	 that	 a	 procedural	 element	 be	 added	 to	 give	 better	 effect	 to	 the	 development	
provisions	 of	 Article	 15102	 while	 the	 African	Group	 put	 forward	 a	more	 detailed	 proposal	
which	 set	 out	 a	more	 comprehensive	 procedure	 as	well	 as	 a	 seemingly	 exhaustive	 list	 of	
‘constructive	remedies’	developed	countries	should	consider	before	applying	anti-dumping	
duties.103	 Of	 the	 three	 Implementation	 Issues	 the	 Committee	 on	 Anti-Dumping	 Practices	
was	 tasked	 to	 discuss,	 Article	 15	 has	 undoubtedly	 been	 the	 most	 difficult	 with	 the	 ADP	
Chairman	reporting	the	existence	of	‘substantially	divergent	views’	on	the	issue	as	well	as	a	
lack	of	‘any	significant	basis	for	consensus.’104	
As	we	know,	while	there	was	agreement	under	Article	15	ADA	that	‘special	regard’	should	
be	 had	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 developing	 countries,	 the	 component	 of	 the	 provision	 which	
relates	to	 ‘how’	such	needs	should	be	taken	 into	account	was	 left	 incompletely	theorised.	
Leaving	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 ADA	 incompletely	 theorised	 has	 not	 provided	 the	 stability	
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associated	with	such	agreements.	This	is	because	underlying	the	lack	of	agreement	on	how	
to	 operationalise	 the	 provision	 was	 the	 existence	 of	 significant	 inequality	 whereby	
developed	countries	were	able	to	articulate	unilaterally	a	‘suitable	response’	to	the	concept	
of	developing	country	needs.	
The	 trend	 identified	 above	may	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 respect	 of	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	WTO	
covered	 agreements	which	 direct	 that	 technical	 assistance	 be	 granted	 to	 developing	 and	
least-developed	countries.	An	example	can	be	found	in	TRIPS	Article	67	pursuant	to	which	
developed	 countries	 were	 tasked	 to	 provide	 on	 request	 and	 on	 mutually	 agreed	 terms	
technical	and	financial	assistance	to	developing	and	least	developed	countries	to	meet	their	
implementation	needs.	The	vagueness	of	the	direction	under	Article	67	has	resulted	in	the	
provision	 of	 assistance	which	 at	 times	 did	more	 to	 favour	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 developed	
country	grantor	than	the	specific	needs	of	the	developing	country	at	issue.105	The	relatively	
voluntary	nature	of	technical	assistance,	despite	frequent	use	of	the	verb	‘shall’	in	regard	to	
the	 direction	 to	 provide	 such	 assistance,	 became	 a	 particular	 bone	 of	 contention	 by	
developing	country	beneficiaries.	The	 lack	of	a	binding	and	 justiciable	commitment	on	the	
part	of	developed	countries	to	provide	technical	assistance	to	their	developing	counterparts	
was	 particularly	 troubling	 given	 the	 high	 cost	 of	 implementing	 certain	 of	 the	 WTO	
agreements	such	as	the	TRIPS	agreement.106	Thus,	as	is	oft	quoted,	‘[d]eveloping	countries	
accepted	bound	commitments	to	implement	[and]	received	unbound	promises	of	assistance	
to	do	so.’107		
What	is	perhaps	most	interesting	about	certain	of	the	provisions	for	technical	assistance	is	
their	negotiating	heritage.	The	Secretariat	note	 cited	earlier	 in	 this	 article	 contended	 that	
the	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 provisions	 of	 the	 WTO	 covered	 agreements	 are	
‘tailored’	 in	 accordance	with	 the	needs	under	each	of	 the	Agreements.108	 The	 cogency	of	
this	contention	is	somewhat	reduced	when	one	considers	the	phrasing	of	such	treatment	in	
comparison	with	that	found	under	earlier	GATT	Tokyo	Round	codes.	We	can	see	this	in	the	
WTO	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	Agreement	(TBT)	which	drew	on	earlier	experiences	with	
technical	barriers	to	trade	in	the	Tokyo	Round	Standards	Code.	The	earlier	Standards	Code	
contains	essentially	 identical	provisions	on	technical	assistance	and	special	and	differential	
treatment	 to	 those	 found	 in	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 Agreement	 on	 Technical	 Barriers	 to	
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Trade.109	The	similarity	between	the	provisions	for	special	and	differential	treatment	in	the	
Tokyo	Round	Code	and	Uruguay	Round	Agreement	is	such	that	even	the	same	numbering	is	
used	 with	 Article	 11	 in	 both	 documents	 making	 provision	 for	 the	 grant	 of	 technical	
assistance	while	Article	12	sets	out	the	availability	of	special	and	differential	treatment	for	
developing	countries.	The	difference,	of	course,	between	the	Tokyo	Round	Codes	and	the	
Uruguay	 Round	 Agreements	 is	 that	 while	 the	 former	 were	 voluntary	 plurilateral	
agreements,	the	latter	were	multilateral	and	mandatory	for	all	Members.	
The	 problem	 with	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 TBT	 Agreement	 utilising	 essentially	 the	 same	
provisions	 of	 assistance	 to	 those	 found	 under	 the	 Tokyo	 Round	 Code	 is	 that	 prior	 to	 the	
formation	of	the	WTO	TBT	Agreement,	concerns	were	raised	that	the	provisions	of	the	GATT	
Standards	Code	may	not	be	appropriate	in	meeting	developing	country	needs.	According	to	
one	 commentator,	 ‘Article	 12	 ...	 although	 no	 doubt	 drafted	 with	 a	 view	 to	 the	 special	
problems	of	developing	countries,	may	in	practice	result	in	exacerbating	these	problems.’110	
The	reason	given	for	this	pronouncement	was	that,	‘[m]ost	of	the	provisions	of	this	Article	
are	of	a	hortatory	nature	...’111	Accordingly,	in	a	1985	Special	Meeting	of	the	Committee	on	
Technical	 Barriers	 to	 Trade	 held	 to	 review	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Code	 as	 well	 as	 any	
obstacles	 to	 acceptance	 developing	 countries	may	 have	 faced,	 it	 was	 acknowledged	 that	
developing	 countries	 had	 experienced	 particular	 administrative	 difficulties	 in	 the	
implementation	 process.112	 	 It	 was	 similarly	 recognised	 that,	 ‘Parties	 considered	 that	 any	
action	 to	 make	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Agreement	 on	 technical	
assistance	more	 effective	would	 also	 be	 of	 value	 in	 improving	 decision-making	 processes	
and	in	facilitating	the	establishment	of	efficient	information	exchange	systems	in	developing	
countries.’113	 While	 several	 countries	 received	 technical	 assistance	 to	 help	 in	 their	
implementation	 of	 Code	 and	 expressed	 their	 gratitude	 for	 this	 help,	 others	 were	 more	
circumspect	 in	 their	 praise	 and	 called	 for	 ‘special	 efforts’	 to	 be	 made	 to	 improve	 the	
operation	of	its	provisions.114	
Given	 that	 the	 Tokyo	Round	 Standards	 Code	was	 signed	 by	 less	 than	 forty	 countries,	 the	
overwhelming	majority	of	which	were	industrialised,	the	logic	of	transplanting	its	provisions	
of	 assistance	 into	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 Agreement,	 particularly	 given	 the	 more	 extensive	
coverage	of	the	latter	Agreement	is	somewhat	questionable.	The	question	therefore	has	to	
be	 raised	 as	 to	 why	 the	 provisions	 of	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 in	 the	 Uruguay	
Round	TBT	Agreement	were	constructed	in	this	way.	In	part,	the	answer	appears	to	be	that	
while	it	was	recognised	in	certain	quarters	that	developing	countries	may	have	struggled	in	
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meeting	their	obligations	under	the	Tokyo	Round	Code,	negotiators	 in	the	Uruguay	Round	
had	only	 a	 limited	 knowledge	of	 developing	 country	 expertise	 and	experience	 in	 this	 and	
other	 ‘new’	 areas.115	 Furthermore,	 the	 formulation	 of	 these	 provisions	 was	 undoubtedly	
underpinned	by	the	narrative	that	‘one	size	fits	all,’	a	narrative	which	to	a	large	extent	was	a	
‘central	pillar	of	the	Uruguay	Round.’116	To	this	end,	the	focus	of	negotiations	was	to	identify	
specific	 rules	 which	 could	 be	 implemented	 across	 the	 board,	 as	 opposed	 to	 finding	 an	
accommodation	 which	 suited	 individual	 country	 needs.117	 It	 is	 hence	 apparent	 that	 the	
provision	 of	 technical	 assistance	 was	 mandated118	 to	 assist	 countries	 to	 meet	 their	
implementation	commitments,	thereby	underlining	the	progressive	linearity	inherent	in	the	
Uruguay	Round	agreements.		
Expanding	on	the	above,	by	agreeing	to	the	construction	of	SDT	under	the	GATT	as	a	set	of	
exceptions	 to	 the	 normal	 rules	 of	 the	 trade	 regime,	 developed	 countries	 were	 able	 to	
construct	 the	 trade	 regime	 according	 to	 their	 own	 vision.	 This,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Lamp,	
‘allowed	 them	 to	 preserve	 their	 preferred	 design	 of	 the	 trade	 regime…	 while	 keeping	
developing	countries	within	the	system.’119	Hence,	developing	country	demands	under	the	
GATT	 for	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 trade	 regime	were	 conceptualised	 as	 outside	what	 has	 been	
termed	the	‘normal’	trade	regime.	This	therefore	set	the	scene	for	the	eradication	of	such	
difference	under	 the	Uruguay	Round	with	 the	SDT	provisions	 therein	designed	to	assist	 in	
implementation	 the	 WTO	 agreements	 rather	 than	 offer	 an	 alternative	 vision	 for	 the	
multilateral	trade	regime.		
What	 the	differential	 treatment	provisions	of	 the	GSP,	Article	67	of	 the	TRIPS	Agreement,	
Articles	11	and	12	of	the	TBT	and,	Article	15	ADA	have	in	common	is	their	construction	as	
incompletely	 theorised	 agreements.	 Like	 many	 of	 other	 SDT	 provisions,	 they	 illustrate	
agreement	on	mid/low	level	principles	such	as	that	developing	countries	should	be	provided	
with	technical	assistance,	that	their	needs	should	be	taken	into	account	in	certain	situations	
or	that	they	should	be	granted	additional	time	to	implement	their	obligations.	However,	the	
‘theory’	which	accounts	for	these	principles	is	incompletely	theorised	as,	in	many	respects,	
is	the	outcome	these	principles	call	for.	Accordingly,	it	may	be	stated	that	agreement	exists	
in	 respect	 of	 the	 principle	 that	 Members	 ‘shall’	 facilitate,	 for	 example,	 the	 trade	
opportunities	of	developing	countries	but	the	theory	which	accounts	for	such	treatment	is	
under-theorised	 and	 there	 is	 little	 direction	 given	 as	 to	 ‘how’	 this	 principle	 may	 be	
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operationalised.	Indeed,	as	we	have	seen,	many	of	the	provisions	under	this	categorization	
allow	for	bias	and	self-interest;	that	is,	a	unilateral	articulation	to	be	advanced	of	how	such	
provisions	should	be	operationalised.	We	drew	attention	to	provision	of	technical	assistance	
which	at	times	did	more	to	favour	the	interests	of	the	developed	country	grantor	than	the	
specific	needs	of	the	developing	country	at	issue.120	 	The	self-interest	associated	with	such	
incomplete	 theorisation	 did	 little	 to	 promote	 stability	 but	 instead	 led	 to	 normatively	
troubling	 accusations	 of	 bias	 and	 inconsistency	 in	 how	 developing	 and	 least-developed	
country	needs	were	addressed121	and	also	prompted	a	review	of	SDT	under	paragraph	44	of	
the	Doha	Round	mandate.		
As	 articulated	 by	 Sunstein,	 ‘fuller	 theorisation’	 of	 an	 issue	 may	 be	 of	 benefit	 so	 as	 to	
promote	 a	 ‘wider	 and	 deeper	 inquiry	 into	 the	 grounds	 for	 judgment’	 so	 as	 to	 prevent	
‘inconsistency,	bias,	or	 self	 interest.’122	 In	 the	next	and	penultimate	section	of	 this	article,	
we	 look	 to	 the	 future	 of	 SDT	 and	 ask	whether	 such	 fuller	 theorisation	of	 its	 provisions	 is	
possible	before	positing	that	SDT	is	currently	in	a	transitional	or	liminal	state.		
	
SECTION	4	-	LIMINAL	SPACES:	SDT	GOING	FORWARD		
In	 the	above	section,	we	drew	attention	 to	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	nature	of	SDT.	We	
also	elucidated	upon	the	ramifications	of	this,	detailing	how	the	provisions	became	tainted	
with	 self-interest,	 bias	 and	 inconsistency.	 The	 normatively	 troubling	 aspects	 of	 the	 legal	
construction	of	SDT	in	this	way	were	alluded	to,	as	were	some	of	the	efforts	under	the	Doha	
Round	 to	more	 fully	 theorise	 SDT.	 In	 this	penultimate	 section,	we	 seek	 to	draw	upon	 the	
lessons	 learned	 in	 the	above	 section	 to	ponder	 the	question,	what	next	 for	 SDT?	 Is	more	
complete	 theorisation	possible	 such	as	 to	 reduce	or	even	eradicate	 the	more	normatively	
troubling	aspects	of	SDT?	
	
The	above	question(s)	 is	particularly	pertinent	given	the	continuing	prominence	of	SDT	for	
the	 trade	 regime.	This	 continuing	prominence	manifests	 in	a	number	of	ways;	 the	 review	
process	of	SDT	initiated	in	2001	has	not	as	yet	concluded123	and	SDT	still	forms	an	‘integral’	
element	of	the	bread	and	butter	of	the	multilateral	trade	regime,	that	is,	‘traditional’	market	
access	negotiations.	Beyond	this,	SDT	is	also	to	the	fore	in	current	negotiations	on	fisheries	
subsidies	 which	 aim	 to,	 ‘prohibit	 certain	 forms	 of	 fisheries	 subsidies	 which	 contribute	 to	
overcapacity	 and	 overfishing,	 and	 eliminate	 subsidies	 that	 contribute	 to	 IUU	 fishing,	 and	
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refrain	 from	 introducing	 new	 such	 subsidies.’124	 These	 negotiations	 recognize	 that,	
‘appropriate	 and	 effective	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 for	 developing	 and	 least-
developed	Members	should	be	an	integral	part	of	the	fisheries	subsidies	negotiations.’125	
	
More	 pertinently,	 SDT	 is	 very	much	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	WTO	Trade	 Facilitation	Agreement	
(TFA)	which	entered	into	force	in	February	2017.	The	TFA	is	the	first	new	multilateral	trade	
agreement	to	be	agreed	this	century.	It	aims	to	reduce	barriers	to	the	movement	of	goods	
across	borders	by,	among	other	things,	reducing	bureaucracy.126	The	economic	benefits	of	
the	TFA	are	 such	 that	 it	 is	 estimated	 to	expand	 trade	by	$1	 trillion.127	 Perhaps	of	 greater	
significance,	at	 least	for	our	purpose,	 is	the	approach	taken	to	SDT	under	the	TFA.	 	 In	this	
respect,	 under	 the	 TFA,	 developing	 and	 least	 developed	 countries	 are	 able	 to	 tie	
implementation	 of	 its	 provisions	 to	 the	 receipt	 of	 technical	 assistance	 and	 capacity	
building.128	 From	 a	 WTO	 perspective,	 this	 is	 a	 unique	 feature	 of	 the	 agreement	 and	
demonstrates	 more	 complete	 theorisation	 of	 SDT	 at	 a	 number	 of	 levels.129	 There	 is	
agreement	not	only	that	SDT	should	be	a	fundamental	component	of	the	Agreement	but	the	
low	level	principles	or	in	effect,	the	operationalisation	of	SDT	is	more	completely	theorised	
through,	among	other	things,	needs	based	assessments,	thereby	representing	 ‘a	new	type	
of	fine-tuned’130	differentiation.	
	
Some	commentators	have	opined	that	the	TFA	could	offer	something	of	a	model	for	future	
negotiations	 on	 SDT.131	 The	 SDT	 provisions	 under	 it	 certainly	 have	 evolved	 from	 merely	
‘perfunctorily	 addressing	 the	 genuine	 concerns	 of	 developing	 country	 members	 to	
recognising	the	need	to	provide	structured	and	mandated	support…”132	Perhaps,	however,	
of	greater	significance	is	the	overturning	of	the	notion	of	‘special’	treatment	under	the	TFA.	
To	 expand,	 and	 drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Nicolas	 Lamp,	 developing	 countries	 have	
participated	 in	 the	 trade	 regime	 since	 its	 inception	 and	 now	 represent	 the	 majority	 of	
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members.133	Why	 then,	 is	 accommodating	 the	needs	of	developing	not	 conceptualised	as	
‘the	‘normal’	approach,	the	default	option,	in	multilateral	trade	lawmaking?’134		
	
If	 the	 TFA	 can	 be	 said	 to	 offer	 a	 new	 paradigm	 for	 trade	 law	making,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 move	
towards	developing	country	and	LDC	concerns	being	treated	as	part	of	the	normal	routine	
of	multilateral	 trade	negotiations	rather	 than	through	the	 lens	of	exceptions	and	opt	outs	
from	the	‘normal’	trade	regime	defined	by	developed	country	interests.135	It	also	allows	us	
to	 move	 beyond	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 conceptualisation	 of	 SDT	 as	 concerned	 with	 the	
adjustment	 of	 developing	 countries	 to	 the	 developed	world’s	 vision	 of	 ‘normalcy.’136	 The	
problem	with	the	lens	of	abnormal/normal	is	its	tendency	to,	‘deprive	the	regime	of	insights	
into	alternative	possibilities	for	international	economic	co-operation.’137	
	
In	this	regard,	what	the	seismic	shift	to	SDT	apparent	under	the	TFA	evokes	is	the	idea	that	
particular	understandings	of	trade	law	are	not	self-evident	but	instead	are	constructed	over	
time.138	Dismantling	such	constructions	may	allow	us	to	‘reimagine’	the	trade	law	project.139	
Indeed,	in	the	words	of	Neufeld,	‘(i)t	will	be	difficult,	for	instance,	to	define	S&D	treatment	
in	 future	WTO	Agreements	without	 at	 least	 considering	 the	 TF	model.	 The	 inclusive,	 de–
centralized	 way	 of	 conducting	 the	 talks	 is	 also	 likely	 to	 set	 new	 standards	 in	 the	 trade	
negotiating	 business.’140	 What	 remains	 to	 be	 seen,	 however,	 are	 the	 mechanics	 of	 such	
normalisation.	Whether	 the	 complexity	 involved	 in	 the	 TFA	 under	 which	 developing	 and	
least	developed	countries	have	highly	individualised	commitments	can	be	replicated	across	
other	disciplines	is,	for	example,	questionable.141		
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Therefore,	 in	 answering	 the	 question	 of	 ‘where	 or	what	 next’	 for	 SDT,	 a	 tension	may	 be	
identified.	The	negotiations	on	 the	TFA,	 for	example,	point	 to	a	more	 inclusive	manner	of	
conducting	trade	negotiations	whereby	developing	country	needs,	as	encapsulated	in	SDT,	
were	 very	much	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 final	 text	 of	 the	 Agreement.	 SDT	 is	 more	 completely	
theorised	under	the	text	of	the	TFA	but	whether	this	approach	will	be	replicated	in	future	
areas	 of	 trade	 law	 making	 is	 uncertain.	 What	 is	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	
under/incompletely	theorised	approach	to	the	traditional	form	of	SDT	examined	above	was	
a	 choice.	 The	 TFA	 hence	 demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 make	 another	 choice;	 to	
reimagine	 the	 trade	 regime142	 so	 that	 developing	 country	 needs	 are	 more	 completely	
theorised	and	in	the	words	of	Lamp,	are	considered	as	a	‘normal’	part	of	negotiations.143	
	
I	therefore	posit	that	SDT	is	currently	in	a	liminal	space	with	use	of	the	term	liminal	intended	
to	describe	a	state	of	transition.	While	 it	 is	clear	that	the	TFA	provisions	on	SDT	are	more	
completely	theorised	than	those	which	pertain	to	what	I	have	referred	to	as	traditional	SDT,	
questions	marks	remain	over	the	higher	order	principles	which	 inform	the	grant	of	special	
and	 differential	 treatment	 on	 a	 general	 level.	 These	 question	 marks	 are	 of	 considerable	
consequence	as	the	political	economy	of	the	trade	regime	is	likely	to	see	seismic	shifts	in	the	
coming	 years	 stemming	 from,	 among	 other	 things,	 the	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 the	 U.S.	
administration’s	 trade	 policy.	 Some,	 for	 example,	 have	 questioned	 whether	 the	 U.S	
withdrawal	 from	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 on	 climate	 change	marks	 a	 ‘first	 salvo	 against	 the	
Special	and	Differential	Treatment?’144	Accordingly,	while	SDT	will	remain	an	integral	part	of	
the	trade	regime	for	many	years	to	come,	its	liminality	is	very	much	in	evidence.		
	
	
CONCLUSIONS	
	
My	analysis	 suggests	 that	 the	 traditional	 form	of	 SDT	under	 the	multilateral	 trade	 regime	
can	be	conceptualised	through	the	lens	provided	by	Sunstein’s	construct	of	the	incompletely	
theorised	agreement.	In	this	regard,	we	reviewed	a	range	of	SDT	provisions	and	found	that	
that	 they	 were	 constructed	 as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement;	 that	 is,	 there	 was	
agreement	 on	principles	 such	 as	 non-reciprocity	 or	 preferential	 tariff	 treatment	 but	what	
these	principles	entail	 in	 individual	cases	or	the	theory	which	 informs	such	treatment	was	
left	incompletely	theorised.	The	benefit	of	the	incompletely	theorised	agreement	set	at	this	
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level	 is	 that	 it	 allowed	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 to	 be	 granted	 while	 avoiding	
contestation	on	the	related	questions	of	‘why’	and	‘how.’	In	the	abstract,	this	should	have	
provided	the	system	with	much	needed	stability	but,	as	we	have	seen,	such	stability	may	be	
lost	if	the	incomplete	theorisation	serves	to	hide	the	existence	of	certain	abstractions	such	
as	 inequality	or	 injustice,	resulting	 in	an	erosion	of	the	stability	underlying	the	agreement.	
This	was	 indeed	 the	 case	as	we	demonstrated	 in	our	 review	of	 a	 range	of	 SDT	provisions	
which	permitted	a	unilateral	construction	of	developing	country	needs	to	be	put	forward	by	
developed	 country	 donors.	 We	 further	 identified	 transition	 periods	 as	 a	 type	 of	
incompletely	theorised	agreement.	What	was	incompletely	theorised	was	the	higher	order	
principles	of	why	such	treatment	should	be	granted	in	the	first	place	with,	as	acknowledged	
by	 the	 Secretariat,	 SDT	 failing	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 general	 principle.	 This	 lack	 of	 incomplete	
theorisation	 led	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 enquire	 as	 to	 the	 suitability	 of	 such	measures	 to	 address	
developing	country	needs.		
The	conceptual	frame	provided	by	the	incompletely	theorised	agreement	also	allowed	us	to	
interrogate	 the	 failings	 of	 SDT	 and	 how	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	 construction	 of	 these	
provisions	 led	to	accusations	of	bias,	 inconsistency	and	self-interest.	 In	this	regard,	we	are	
reminded	by	Sunstein	that	the	benefits	of	an	incompletely	theorised	agreement	will	at	times	
be	 limited.	As	 such,	 ‘fuller	 theorisation’	of	an	 issue	may	be	of	benefit	 so	as	 to	promote	a	
‘wider	and	deeper	 inquiry	 into	 the	grounds	 for	 judgment’	 so	as	 to	prevent	 ‘inconsistency,	
bias,	or	self	interest.’	
It	is	clear	that	fuller	theorisation	of	SDT	is	required	in	order	to	address	its	deficiencies.	As	we	
discussed	above,	 a	 review	process	of	 SDT	was	 initiated	under	 the	Doha	Round	 though	 its	
results	 are	 still	 pending.145	 In	 contrast	 to	 this	 rather	 stalled	 negotiating	 mandate,	 we	
examined	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 new	 Trade	 Facilitation	 Agreement,	 elucidating	 upon	 how	
SDT	forms	a	central	component	of	the	Agreement’s	provisions.	We	evaluated	how	the	type	
of	SDT	offered	under	the	TFA	is	more	completely	theorised	and,	as	such,	has	the	potential	to	
act	 as	 a	 new	 paradigm	 for	 multilateral	 trade	 law	making	 whereby	 developing	 and	 least-
developed	 country	 needs	 are	 more	 completely	 theorised	 and,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Lamp,	
become	 a	 normal	 part	 of	 negotiations.146	 The	 extent	 that	 this	 potential	 new	 paradigm	 is	
adopted	 depends	 largely	 on	 the	 political	 will	 of	 the	WTO	membership.	 It	 was	 therefore	
stated	 that	SDT	resides	within	a	 liminal	 state	with	 the	 term	 liminal	 intended	to	evoke	 the	
idea	of	transition.	
While	 the	end	point	of	 SDT’s	 liminality	 is	not	 yet	 known,	we	can	make	 two	points	at	 this	
juncture;	the	first	relates	to	the	idea(l)	set	by	the	TFA	whereby	SDT	can	be	subject	to	more	
complete	theorisation	such	as	to	avoid	the	risk	of	bias,	self-interest	and	inconsistency.	The	
fact	that	the	SDT	provisions	examined	above	were	left	incompletely	theorised	was	a	political	
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choice	rather	than	an	inevitability.	This	idea(l)	represented	by	the	TFA	points	to	a	realm	of	
possibility	 whereby	 SDT	 is	 not	 merely	 ad	 hoc	 or	 ‘tokenseque’147	 but	 rather	 is	 more	
completely	 theorised	 so	 as	 to	 address	 the	 needs	 of	 developing	 and	 least-developed	
countries	as	part	of	the	‘normal’	course	of	multilateral	trade	law	making.148		
The	 second	 point	 relates	 to	 the	 liminality	 of	 SDT;	 it	 is	 likely	 helpful	 to	 think	 of	 GATT	
differential	 and	 more	 favourable	 treatment	 as	 a	 type	 of	 first	 generation	 SDT	 and	 the	
Uruguay	 Round	 agreements	 provisions	 on	 differential	 treatment	 as	 a	 second	 generation	
SDT.149	 It	 may	 therefore	 be	 the	 case	 that	 we	 are	 entering	 a	 third	 generation	 of	 SDT,	
represented	by	the	collaborative	and	inclusive	efforts	to	trade	law	making	apparent	in	the	
construction	of	the	TFA.	If	we	really	are	embarking	upon	a	third	generation	of	SDT	–	and	this	
very	much	depends	upon	political	will	–	then	there	is	a	pressing	need	to	sketch	the	contours	
of	this	new	generation	of	differential	treatment.	In	pursuing	this	research	agenda,	we	need	
to	garner	a	range	of	conceptual	tools	to	allow	for	a	robust	critique	of	future	SDT	proposals	
so	 as	 to	 channel	 debate	 on	 the	 development	 of	 this	 area	 of	 trade	 law	 and	 practice.	 This	
article	 begins	 this	 quest	 for	 new	 conceptual	 tools	 by	 analysing	 Sunstein’s	 incompletely	
theorised	 agreement	which,	 as	we	 have	 seen,	 provides	 a	 powerful	 critical	 framework	 for	
analysing	such	provisions	in	the	future.		
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